(Washington, D.C.) – Today, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) applauds the Department of Navy for issuing a commendation to military aviation whistleblower Richard Conrad. An award ceremony was held last Friday, February 1, at the Navy’s Fleet Readiness Center Southwest (FRCSW) at North Island, San Diego. Conrad, a Vietnam veteran and 25-year civilian employee with the Navy, was presented with a commendation for playing “a major part in effecting…improvements” to the repair and overhaul process of certain flight critical components on the Navy’s aging fleet of F/A-18 aircraft.

Conrad’s whistleblowing led to an investigation by the Navy that confirmed his allegations of improper repairs on F/A-18s while also indicting North Island management for failing to provide the tools needed for proper repairs. Several modifications to the repair process ultimately resulted from Conrad’s disclosures. But Conrad cautions that the Navy’s reluctance to notify the F/A-18 Fleet of the improved repair process, to conduct retroactive inspections, and to engage in a meaningful review of the Depot system leaves the F/A-18 Fleet unnecessarily vulnerable to reliability and safety problems.

“It took several years of pounding my head against a brick wall before they even provided us with the tools we needed to do the job,” states Conrad, who retired from the Department of Navy last year. “My concern has always been the safety and reliability of the product the Depot sends to the U.S. Navy and our allies. I’m not satisfied that enough has been done.”

GAP Legislative Representative Adam Miles encouraged congressional intervention. “Conrad’s disclosures provide a window into a support structure for the Navy that is not up to par. It will take additional scrutiny from Congress to ensure that the naval aircraft moving through the Depots safe and reliable.”

Conrad, who is represented by GAP, blew the whistle in 2005 on improper maintenance and repairs of the Generator Converter Unit (GCU) on the Navy’s F/A-18 A-D models. The function of the GCU is to supply electrical power to the aircraft. Conrad informed his supervisors that GCUs were not being repaired and overhauled according to military specifications, leaving the component vulnerable to electrical shorting. Conrad alleged that managers in his shop did not provide electrical mechanics with the tools necessary to perform torquing on GCUs as required by Naval technical specifications.

The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Inspector General conducted an investigation into Conrad’s allegations in 2006. It confirmed that North Island artisans were not provided with the torque tools needed to repair GCUs on F/A-18s in compliance with military specifications. An engineering analysis noted:

“At worst, mis-torqued screws could result in premature failure of the GCU through overheating …In the event that one GCU fails for any reason, the aircraft electrical power distribution system is configured to immediately transfer that GCUs bus to the opposite GCU at which point the pilot would return to base as soon as practical.”

Citing the information above, the investigation concluded that because of “redundant” back-up systems, the possibility of GCU failure caused by improperly torqued screws does not present an immediate “safety of flight” issue. However, the official Report of Investigation failed to include a particularly relevant document from its investigative file: The Naval Safety Center reported to investigators that, in fact, a 2003 F/A-18 crash had been attributed to GCU failure, and an outstanding investigative report on a 2006 crash left open that possibility. GAP obtained the full investigative file through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

“It’s inexcusable that the full scope of available information was not included in the Report of Investigation, and had to be discovered after the fact,” stated Miles. “The omission of this key document calls into question the Navy’s confident assertions about the safety of these components.”

Conrad noted that the GCUs are still being tested in a condemned building at FRCSW. “What does this say about FRCSW’s commitment to our pilots’ safety?” he questioned.

The investigation further confirmed that Depot supervisors were aware of the need for calibrated torque tools to properly repair GCUs as early as 2003. Yet, no action was taken to procure the necessary torque tools until 2005. The supervisors denied the allegations, prompting the investigators to conclude that “the testimony of supervisors who asserted the GCU artisans had the proper tools and were complying with torque values in the Manual is not credible.” The U.S. Office of Special Counsel, which reviewed the NAVAIR investigation, recommended that Conrad’s supervisors be disciplined for their mismanagement.

These same managers subjected Conrad to a series of retaliatory actions, which ultimately forced Conrad to accept an early retirement offer from the Navy last year. After alerting his superiors of his concerns, Conrad was isolated from the rest of the workforce, stripped of all meaningful job duties, and lost all overtime pay after December 2005. After being transferred, for the next 18 months he was given an average of approximately 10 minutes of work per eight-hour shift, and spent the majority of his time reading books – on the taxpayer’s dime.

“Mr. Conrad personifies the ‘nuts and bolts’ whistleblowers whose professionalism regularly makes a difference between life and death,” noted GAP Legal Director Tom Devine. “Our nation’s security and our pilot’s safety depend on the Richard Conrads of society. Mr. Conrad also personifies why nearly completed legislation to revive the judicially-gutted Whistleblower Protection Act must be finished without further delay.”

Conrad is available for comment.